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A Legislative Voting Procedures in a Comparative Perspective
Table OA.A1 presents information on legislative voting procedures for 145 legislative chambers
across 105 countries. All information concerns most legislative business. The table includes the
following:
• The country associated with the relevant chamber.
• The name of the chamber in the native language.
• The chamber type (lower, upper, or unicameral).
• Whether the standard operating procedure (SOP) is roll-call (RCV) or non-roll-call (non-RCV).
• The precise method defined as the SOP – electronic voting machines (EVM), voices, show of
hands, rising in places, etc.
• Whether legislative actors can invoke a voting method that departs from the SOP – either
from RCV to non-RCV or non-RCV to RCV.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers
To estimate the contemporary importance of different legislatures in terms of scholarly research, we
counted the number of articles published in journals covered by the Social Science Citation Index
(SSCI) from 1990 to March 2018. The SSCI includes primarily English language journals, but also
includes journals published in other languages.
In designing our search algorithm, we focused on a common set of search criteria.21 We recognize
that some legislatures may have specific characteristics that cause this common set of criteria to
over- or under-count the number of relevant cites. But we have no reason to believe such errors
would significantly alter the order of legislatures reported here or change the relative share of articles
attributed to each legislature.
B.1 Search procedure
For each legislative lower house or unicameral legislature, we searched by topic for articles according
to the following criteria: country name (both as noun and adjective) with (a) the names of the
legislature in English or in the native language, or (b) “chamber of deputies” or “parliament”. For
upper legislative houses, we changed criterion (b) to include “upper house”. We present our data in
Table OA.B1. The table presents the following information about each chamber:
• The associated country.
• The name of the chamber in the native language.
• The chamber type (lower, upper, or unicameral).
• The number of articles that focus on the chamber.
• The number of articles that focus on the chamber as a percentage of all articles across all 145
chambers.
21The full search code algorithm is available from the authors upon request.
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Table OA.B1: Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers
Country Chamber Chamber SOP # of % of
Name Type Art. Art.
United States Senate Upper Non-RCV 483 13.77
United States House of Lower Non-RCV 408 11.63
Representatives
Germany Bundestag Lower Non-RCV 373 10.63
United Kingdom House of Commons Lower Non-RCV 322 9.18
Australia House of Lower Non-RCV 108 3.08
Representatives
Canada House of Commons Lower Non-RCV 97 2.77
France Assemblée Nationale Lower Non-RCV 93 2.65
Italy Camera dei Deputati Lower Non-RCV 85 2.42
Sweden Riksdag Unicameral RCV SOP but 83 2.37
not mandatory
Ireland Dáil Éireann Lower Non-RCV 80 2.28
Netherlands Tweede Kamer der Lower Non-RCV 79 2.25
Staten-Generaal
Spain Congreso de los Lower Non-RCV 77 2.19
Diputados
Norway Storting Unicameral RCV SOP but 73 2.08
not mandatory
Switzerland Nationalrat Lower RCV mandatory 72 2.05
Denmark Folketing Unicameral RCV SOP but 68 1.94
not mandatory
New Zealand House of Unicameral Non-RCV 67 1.91
Representatives
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Table OA.B1: Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers (continued)
Country Chamber Chamber SOP # of % of
Name Type Art. Art.
Poland Sejm Lower RCV mandatory 60 1.71
Belgium Chambre des Lower Non-RCV 57 1.62
Représentants
Australia Senate Upper Non-RCV 52 1.48
Austria Nationalrat Lower Non-RCV 48 1.37
Israel Knesset Unicameral RCV SOP but 48 1.37
not mandatory
Hungary Országgyűlés Unicameral RCV mandatory 43 1.23
Germany Bundesrat Upper Non-RCV 40 1.14
Czech Republic Poslanecká Lower RCV mandatory 37 1.05
Sněmovna
Finland Eduskunta Unicameral RCV SOP but 36 1.03
not mandatory
United Kingdom House of Lords Upper Non-RCV 27 0.77
Greece Voulí Ton Ellínon Unicameral Non-RCV 27 0.77
India Lok Sabha Lower Non-RCV 24 0.68
Romania Camera Deputatilor Lower RCV SOP but 22 0.63
not mandatory
Turkey Büyük Millet Meclisi Unicameral Non-RCV 22 0.63
Brazil Câmara dos Lower Non-RCV 21 0.60
Deputados
Mexico Cámara de Lower Non-RCV 19 0.54
Diputados
Portugal Assembleia da Unicameral Non-RCV 17 0.48
República
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Table OA.B1: Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers (continued)
Country Chamber Chamber SOP # of % of
Name Type Art. Art.
South Africa National Assembly Lower RCV mandatory 17 0.48
Canada Senate Upper Non-RCV 16 0.46
Argentina Cámara de Lower Non-RCV 15 0.43
Diputados
Slovakia Národná Rada Unicameral RCV mandatory 15 0.43
South Korea Daehan Minguk Unicameral RCV SOP but 14 0.40
Gukhoe not mandatory
Bulgaria Narodno Sabranie Unicameral Non-RCV 13 0.37
Lithuania Seimas Unicameral RCV SOP but 10 0.29
not mandatory
Mexico Senado Upper Non-RCV 10 0.29
Uruguay Cámara de Lower Non-RCV 10 0.29
Representantes
Chile Cámara de Lower RCV mandatory 9 0.26
Diputados
Uganda Parliament Unicameral Non-RCV 9 0.26
Estonia Riigikogu Unicameral RCV mandatory 8 0.23
Rwanda Umutwe w’Abadepite Lower NA 8 0.23
Slovenia Državni Zbor Lower RCV mandatory 8 0.23
Spain Senado Upper Non-RCV 8 0.23
Ireland Seanad Éireann Upper Non-RCV 6 0.17
Luxembourg Chambre des Unicameral Non-RCV 6 0.17
Députes
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Table OA.B1: Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers (continued)
Country Chamber Chamber SOP # of % of
Name Type Art. Art.
Malta Parlament Unicameral Non-RCV 6 0.17
Peru Congreso Unicameral RCV SOP but 6 0.17
not mandatory
South Africa National Council Upper Non-RCV 6 0.17
of Provinces
Argentina Senado Upper Non-RCV 5 0.14
Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad Unicameral Non-RCV 5 0.14
Cuba Asamblea Nacional Unicameral Non-RCV 5 0.14
Czech Republic Senát Upper RCV mandatory 5 0.14
Italy Senato della Upper Non-RCV 5 0.14
Repubblica
Malaysia Dewan Rakyat Lower Non-RCV 5 0.14
Switzerland Ständerat Upper Non-RCV 5 0.14
Croatia Hrvatski Sabor Unicameral RCV SOP but 4 0.11
not mandatory
Ecuador Asamblea Nacional Unicameral Non-RCV 4 0.11
France Sénat Upper Non-RCV 4 0.11
Georgia Sakartvelos Unicameral RCV mandatory 4 0.11
P’arlament’i
Latvia Saeima Unicameral RCV mandatory 4 0.11
Nicaragua Asamblea Nacional Unicameral RCV SOP but 4 0.11
not mandatory
Palestine Al-Majlis al-Tashr̄ı’iyy Unicameral Non-RCV 4 0.11
al-Filast.̄ıniyy
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Table OA.B1: Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers (continued)
Country Chamber Chamber SOP # of % of
Name Type Art. Art.
Poland Senat Upper RCV SOP but 4 0.11
not mandatory
Serbia Narodna Skupština Unicameral RCV SOP but 4 0.11
not mandatory
Singapore Parliament Unicameral Non-RCV 4 0.11
Bosnia Predstavnički Dom Lower RCV SOP but 3 0.09
not mandatory
Brazil Senado Federal Upper Non-RCV 3 0.09
Ghana Parliament Unicameral Non-RCV 3 0.09
Kenya National Assembly Lower Non-RCV 3 0.09
Kosovo Kuvendi i Kosovës Unicameral Non-RCV 3 0.09
Philippines House of Lower Non-RCV 3 0.09
Representatives
Samoa Legislative Unicameral Non-RCV 3 0.09
Assembly
Austria Bundesrat Upper Non-RCV 2 0.06
Chile Senado Upper RCV mandatory 2 0.06
Colombia Senado Upper Non-RCV 2 0.06
Costa Rica Asamblea Unicameral Non-RCV 2 0.06
Legislativa
Fiji Parliament Unicameral Non-RCV 2 0.06
Guatemala Congreso Unicameral RCV mandatory 2 0.06
India Rajya Sabha Upper Non-RCV 2 0.06
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Table OA.B1: Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers (continued)
Country Chamber Chamber SOP # of % of
Name Type Art. Art.
Macedonia Sobranie Unicameral Non-RCV 2 0.06
Mauritius National Assembly Unicameral Non-RCV 2 0.06
Moldova Parlamentul Unicameral Non-RCV 2 0.06
Pakistan Senate Upper Non-RCV 2 0.06
Papua New National Unicameral Non-RCV 2 0.06
Guinea Parliament
Philippines Senate Upper Non-RCV 2 0.06
Venezuela Asamblea Nacional Unicameral Non-RCV 2 0.06
Albania Kuvendi i Shqipërisë Unicameral Non-RCV 1 0.03
Belgium Sénat Upper Non-RCV 1 0.03
Bhutan Gyelyong Tshogdu Lower Non-RCV 1 0.03
Colombia Cámara de Lower Non-RCV 1 0.03
Representantes
El Salvador Asamblea Legislativa Unicameral Non-RCV 1 0.03
Iceland Althingi Unicameral RCV SOP but 1 0.03
not mandatory
Jamaica House of Lower Non-RCV 1 0.03
Representatives
Montenegro Skupština Unicameral RCV mandatory 1 0.03
Nauru Parliament Unicameral Non-RCV 1 0.03
Pakistan National Assembly Lower Non-RCV 1 0.03
Solomon Islands Parliament Unicameral Non-RCV 1 0.03
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Table OA.B1: Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers (continued)
Country Chamber Chamber SOP # of % of
Name Type Art. Art.
Sri Lanka Parlimenthuwa Unicameral Non-RCV 1 0.03
Thailand Wutthisapha Upper RCV SOP but 1 0.03
not mandatory
Tonga Legislative Unicameral Non-RCV 1 0.03
Assembly
Tuvalu Parliament Unicameral Non-RCV 1 0.03
Uruguay Cámara de Upper Non-RCV 1 0.03
Senadores
Armenia Azgayin Zhoghov Unicameral RCV mandatory 0 0.00
Bahamas House of Assembly Lower Non-RCV 0 0.00
Bahamas Senate Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Barbados House of Assembly Lower Non-RCV 0 0.00
Barbados Senate Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Belize House of Lower Non-RCV 0 0.00
Representatives
Belize Senate Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Bhutan Gyelyong Tshogde Upper RCV SOP but 0 0.00
not mandatory
Bolivia Cámara de Lower Non-RCV 0 0.00
Diputados
Bolivia Cámara de Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Senadores
Bosnia Dom Naroda Upper RCV SOP but 0 0.00
not mandatory
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Table OA.B1: Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers (continued)
Country Chamber Chamber SOP # of % of
Name Type Art. Art.
Burkina Faso l’Assemblée Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
Nationale
Dominica House of Assembly Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
Dominican Cámara de Lower RCV mandatory 0 0.00
Republic Diputados
Dominican Senado Upper RCV mandatory 0 0.00
Republic
Ethiopia Yehizbtewekayoch Lower Non-RCV 0 0.00
Mekir Bet
Guyana National Assembly Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
Honduras Congreso Nacional Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
Isle of Man House of Keys Lower Non-RCV 0 0.00
Isle of Man Legislative Council Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Jamaica Senate Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Kenya Senate Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Liberia House of Lower Non-RCV 0 0.00
Representatives
Liberia Senate Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Malaysia Dewan Negara Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Maldives Rayyithunge Unicameral RCV SOP but 0 0.00
Majilis not mandatory
Marshall Legislature Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
Islands
Micronesia Congress Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
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Table OA.B1: Legislative Politics Research Across Chambers (continued)
Country Chamber Chamber SOP # of % of
Name Type Art. Art.
Netherlands Eerste Kamer der Upper RCV SOP but 0 0.00
Staten-Generaal not mandatory
Panama Asamblea Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
Nacional
Paraguay Cámara de Lower Non-RCV 0 0.00
Diputados
Paraguay Cámara de Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
Senadores
Rwanda Sena Upper NA 0 0.00
Senegal Assemblée Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
Nationale
Seychelles National Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
Assembly
Trinidad House of Lower Non-RCV 0 0.00
and Tobago Representatives
Trinidad Senate Upper Non-RCV 0 0.00
and Tobago
Vanuatu Parlement Unicameral Non-RCV 0 0.00
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C Alternative Measures of Legislator Preferences
Studies of mass-elite linkages use several different methods to measure the ideological position of
political actors. A common approach is to identify the perceived ideological positions based on
survey questions that ask the voters or the experts to place political parties on a left-right scale
(Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu, 2014; Bakker et al., 2015). The resulting measure can directly
be compared to the voters’ self-placement on the same scale. However, public opinion or expert
surveys are usually limited to the position of political parties or party leaders so they do not include
information about all individual legislators. An alternative approach is to use elite surveys that ask
the candidates or the incumbents to place themselves on an ideological scale (Burden, 2004). In
order to make sure that the measure is comparable across candidates, the responses are scaled using
the candidates’ placement of political parties on the same ideological scale (Aldrich and McKelvey,
1977; Poole, 1998; Saiegh, 2009). Some of these surveys also include more detailed questions on the
candidates’ positions on policy issues on the public agenda (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart,
2001).
An alternative to survey-based methods, which also relies on the perception of third parties, is
to use information from electoral campaign contributions. McCarty and Poole (1998) and Bonica
(2013) devise measures for candidate ideology by modeling the political action committees’ decisions
about whether and how much to contribute to election campaigns. This method was used to produce
comparable estimates of ideology of the candidates for as well as the incumbents of several offices
such as the Congress, the state legislatures, the federal courts and the boards of education (Bonica,
2014) but the variation in campaign finance regulations and practices limits the applicability of the
method cross-nationally.
Responses to survey questions arguably reflect the sincere preferences of the legislators (Burden,
2004; Saiegh, 2009). For studies of representation, however, the legislators’ public positions and
policy decisions are more relevant. The availability of computerized techniques makes it possible
to analyze political texts such as legislative speeches. Some techniques score texts by comparing
the words to a dictionary (Laver and Garry, 2000) or a “reference text” that was already assigned
a score by the researcher (Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003). Another technique models word count
as a function of ideological position of the text and the importance of the word. This technique
avoids the problem of identifying a dictionary or a reference text that is assumed to have a known
ideological position (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). These methods opened the way to systematically
analyze the legislators’ positions on a diverse set of issues. However, it should be recognized that
access to speech is not equal for all legislators, and the distribution of time on the legislative floor is
influenced by the strategic concerns of party leaders (Proksch and Slapin, 2012). Therefore, the use
of legislative speech as a measure of political ideology is subject to similar problems as using the
roll-call votes.
Apart from voting for a bill, the strongest tool that a legislator can use to support a policy is
cosponsoring a bill. Thus, cosponsorship decisions and networks are also used to estimate ideological
position. It can be argued that cosponsorship is of less direct consequence to policy making compared
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to floor votes and hence less open to the position-taking incentives and agenda-setting powers of party
leadership. One major problem of using cosponsorship decisions is the asymmetrical information
that can be gathered from the decision to cosponsor a bill and not to cosponsor a bill. The latter
does not necessarily mean disapproval of the bill. Given the time constraints that the legislators
face, the measure can be sensitive to the assumptions about which bills the legislator takes into
consideration (Alemán et al., 2009; Desposato, Kearney and Crisp, 2011). More recent studies use
social media networks to measure ideology. Barberá (2015) estimates ideological position based
on the legislators’ decision to “follow” other representatives, political parties, and news outlets on
Twitter. While this is an innovative method, it relies on a rather strong assumption that legislators
interact with their colleagues only if they agree with them.
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D Testing Hypotheses of Voting Transparency
In this section, we examine the relationship between a legislative chamber’s voting procedures and a
number of different factors. To do so, we test the four hypotheses presented in Hug, Wegmann and
Wüest (2015) using our sample of legislative chambers. Specifically, the authors test the following
hypotheses in their article:
Hypothesis 1. The more concentrated candidate selection is in the hands of national
parties, the less likely it is that a transparent voting procedure will be chosen.
Hypothesis 2. If candidates are elected in SMD elections, it is more likely that a
transparent voting procedure will be chosen.
Hypothesis 3. The larger the number of MPs in a parliament, the more likely it is that
a transparent voting procedure will be chosen.
Hypothesis 4. Small parliaments with party-entered candidate selection processes are
less likely to have a transparent voting procedure than large parliaments with party-
centered systems of candidate selection.
For a discussion of the theoretical intuitions behind these hypotheses, please see Hug, Wegmann
and Wüest (2015). In the original analysis, the authors estimate logit models where the dependent
variable assumes a value of 1 if a legislative chamber uses roll-call (open) voting as the standard
operating procedure for final passage votes (0 otherwise). They find support for Hypothesis 1.
Apart from using our own sample and the dependent variable corresponding to votes on most
legislative business (rather than final passage), we tried to keep our analysis as similar as possible
to the original one. In that vein, we use sources contained in the “Quality of Government” dataset
(Teorell et al. 2019) to collect the relevant information. Specifically, Johnson and Wallack (2012)
provide measures of whether parties control the selection of candidates, the prevalence of single-
member seats, and the size of parliamentary chambers. We refer to these measures as Average ballot
under control of party, Size of the chamber, and Single-member district seats.22 We also include two
control variables that indicate whether the legislature can remove the executive and whether it is
bicameral. The relevant information for these two variables are found in Regan, Frank and Clark
(2009) and Johnson and Wallack (2012), respectively. Finally, Hug, Wegmann and Wüest (2015)
omit from their analysis all chambers that are indirectly elected or unelected. We opted to take a
different approach and instead control for the percentage of a chamber’s membership that is directly
elected (Directly elected members). We do so because there are several chambers in our sample where
some members are directly elected while others are not. Rather than drop these observations and
22Average ballot under control of party measures the extent to which parties exercise control over who is placed
in competitive positions on electoral ballots. Higher values indicate the selection process is less party-centered.
Additionally, because Hug, Wegmann and Wüest (2015) drop all indirectly elected or unelected chambers from their
analysis, their measure for single-member districts captures the share of members who are elected in single-member
districts. Because we instead control for the share of members who are directly elected (rather than drop chambers),
our measure captures the share of members from single-member districts even if those members were not directly
elected.
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reduce the size of the sample, we instead control for the prevalence of directly elected members. The
relevant information for this variable is found in the “Varieties of Democracy” dataset (Coppedge
et al. 2019). Because the last year covered in Johnson and Wallack (2012) is 2005, all measures are
set to that year.23 The final dataset we assembled contains 85 chambers (rather than the original
145) due to missing data.24
The results are presented in Models 1 and 2 of Table OA.D1. Model 2 includes an interaction
between Size of the chamber and Average ballot under control of party in order to testHypothesis 4.
As the results show, we do not find much support for any of the hypotheses presented earlier. Across
both models, every relevant variable is statistically insignificant. Important to note, these results are
not very different from those presented Hug, Wegmann and Wüest (2015), where the authors only
find support for Hypothesis 1. However, there are additional differences in the findings we should
note. First, Hug, Wegmann and Wüest (2015) find a negative and statistically significant effect for
chamber size, indicating that larger chambers are associated with less transparent voting procedures.
This actually contradicts the authors’ Hypothesis 3. In contrast, we do not find a significant effect
for chamber size, although the coefficient estimates are positive (as predicted by Hypothesis 3).
Also, Hug, Wegmann and Wüest (2015) do not detect a significant effect for bicameralism, whereas
we present mixed evidence that bicameralism is associated with less transparent voting procedures.
The coefficient estimate for bicameralism is negative and significant in Model 2. Overall, our results
do not appear to be very different from those in Hug, Wegmann and Wüest (2015).
We also thought it was important to examine whether a country’s level of democracy is associated
with the transparency of its legislature’s voting procedures. Whereas the sample from Hug, Wegmann
and Wüest (2015) primarily consists of consolidated European democracies, our sample includes a
high number of developing democracies or even authoritarian regimes. Our immediate intuition is
that voting procedures should become more transparent as the level of democracy increases because
it may be more important to legislators that they establish personal reputations in democracies
than in non-democratic regimes. In order to formally test this intuition, in Models 3 and 4 we
include the Polity IV index (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2018) for 2005 as an independent variable
while keeping all other modeling decisions the same. Higher values for the index correspond to a
more democratic regime. As the results from these models show, we do not find much evidence
that democracy is associated with more transparent voting procedures. While the estimates for
the index are positive, they are insignificant for both Models 3 and 4 (p−values equal 0.127 and
0.135, respectively). Similar to what we find earlier, the results from Models 3 and 4 indicate that
chambers that are part of a bicameral legislature are less likely to employ roll-call votes as the
standard operating procedure.
23Hug, Wegmann and Wüest (2015) do the same in their analysis.
24In comparison, the final sample from Hug, Wegmann and Wüest (2015) that was used for their analysis contained
44 chambers.
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Table OA.D1: Explaining Voting Transparency
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Average ballot under control of party −0.288 0.535 −0.314 0.486
(0.425) (0.681) (0.459) (0.716)
Size of the chamber 0.002 0.050 −0.001 0.046
(0.019) (0.036) (0.019) (0.037)
Size of the chamber × −0.050 −0.047
Average ballot under control of party (0.034) (0.034)
Single-member district seats −0.014 −0.014 −0.011 −0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Legislature can remove executive 0.528 0.470 0.627 0.569
(0.753) (0.758) (0.755) (0.760)
Bicameralism −0.839 −0.864∗ −1.135∗ −1.163∗
(0.515) (0.523) (0.554) (0.564)
Directly elected members 0.003 0.000 0.004 −0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Polity IV index 0.265 0.242
(0.174) (0.162)
(Intercept) −0.399 −0.852 −2.706 −2.899
(1.476) (1.505) (2.141) (2.045)
N 85 85 85 85
AIC 109.732 109.041 108.247 107.846
BIC 126.831 128.582 127.789 129.830
logL −47.866 −46.521 −46.124 −44.923
Standard Errors in Parenthesis. ∗p < 0.1
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E Simulations, Results, and Robustness Checks
E.1 Data Generating Process
E.1.1 Description of Simulation
Before turning to the results and a variety of robustness checks for those presented in the manuscript,
we put forward in greater detail the structure of the data generating process used to create the
various samples of simulated voting records. All annotated code to replicate the simulations is
available online.
Step 1. Define a natural legislature with random draws of parameter values.
Each natural legislature is composed of N = 100 legislators defined by the location of
their ideal points, xj . After setting the ideal points of the two party leaders at 0 and
1 (for the left and right party, respectively), we randomly draw the remaining 98 ideal
points. To define the distributions from which these ideal points are drawn, we take a
random draw of the parameter for party heterogeneity d ∼ U [0.5, 2]. Additionally, we
take a random draw on the parameter φ ∼ U [0.2, 0.8], indicating the proportion of seats
controlled by the right party. With this, we draw (φ ∗N)− 1 ideal points for legislators
of the right party from the distribution xrj ∼ U [1− d, 1 + d] and ((1− φ) ∗N)− 1 ideal
points for legislators of the left party from the distribution x`j ∼ U [−d, d].
Step 2. Generate voting records for all potential motions.
To generate the potential legislative docket, we randomly draw a set of 2000 proposals
and corresponding status quos from the unit interval: b ∼ U [0, 1] and sq ∼ U [0, 1]. While
we constrain the set of potential motions a party leader can propose to this sample, we
do not assume each of these will actually be proposed. We will return to this in Step 5
below.
Given the set of potential motions, we determine how each legislator would vote were
the proposal made and therefore whether the proposal would pass. We assume that
legislators’ votes are entirely driven by policy motivations: if the motion b is closer to
legislator j’s ideal point xj than the current status quo sq, then they will vote in favor of
the motion. Otherwise, they vote against it. These votes are saved in a voting matrix
which we will then subset according to (1) whether the motion would ever be made, and
(2) whether it would receive a roll call vote. In addition, we can now establish whether
each potential motion would pass according to whether it receives at least N2 + 1 votes in
support. This information on passage is also stored as it affects the decision calculus of
the party leader in deciding whether to propose the motion at all.
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Step 3. Generate cohesion score for each legislator on each potential motion.
Given the voting record on a given potential motion, we can define the cohesion score for
each legislator on each potential motion. First, we consider cohesion for those legislators
who are voting with their own party leaders. We define cohesion for such legislators in
party i as the difference between the proportion of legislators in party i voting with party
leader i and the proportion of legislators in party ¬i voting with party leader ¬i. In the
event legislator j in party i votes in alignment with party leader ¬i, we assign a cohesion
score of 0.
Step 4. Establish whether a roll call vote would be requested.
Because taking a vote via roll call does not affect the voting behavior of legislators in this
model, we can establish that a roll call vote will be requested anytime the demonstration
of positive cohesion as defined in Step 3 offsets the cost of requesting a roll call vote, k.
While our choice of k is inductive throughout, typically targeting what we see empirically
as an average number of roll call votes for our sample, we demonstrate in this appendix
the robustness of our results to this choice. We store what hypothetical proposals would
receive a roll call requests for after the following step to subset our sample into observed
(roll call) votes and unobserved votes that would not receive a roll call vote request.
Step 5. Establish whether a party leader would ever propose the potential motion.
Finally, given the set of potential motions and their corresponding voting outcomes,
relative party cohesion scores, and whether either party would request the vote be taken
via roll call, we determine whether either party leader would ever propose the motion in
the first place. If a motion will pass but neither party requests a roll call, the decision
calculus is on policy considerations alone: do they prefer the status quo to the proposed
motion. If either party requests a roll call vote, their decision on whether to propose is a
function of three things: (1) the policy outcome (weighted by α); (2) the cohesion score
revealed on a given bill; and (3) if they were the one to request the roll call, the cost of
doing so (k).
With this information about whether either party leader would propose each potential
motion, we subset the data into two samples. First, we have the sample of all observed
(roll call) votes — i.e., those that a party leader proposes and one or more legislators
calls for a roll call vote. Second, we have the sample of all unobserved votes — i.e., those
that a party leader will propose, but that no legislator requests to be taken by roll call.
With these two samples, we conduct a series of analyses examining the degree to which
the inferences we can draw from the roll call vote sample alone reflect that which we
would draw if we observed the universe of legislative votes.
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E.1.2 Roll Call Vote Samples
The model and corresponding simulation demonstrate why under the proposed motivations only a
subsample of the total number of motions receiving a vote are taken by roll call. In the simulations
that follow, we focus on the consequences of drawing on partial samples of all voting behavior
to extract a variety of quantities of interest scholars are often interested. Before turning to those
analyses, it is helpful to visualize the characteristics of votes likely to receive a roll call vote request.
In the following two panels, we depict the percentage of proposed motions likely to receive a roll call
vote given parameter values for party heterogeneity (d), seat share of the right party (φ), the weight
assigned to policy compared to cohesion benefits α, and the cost of requesting a roll call vote (k).
Within each panel, we hold the values of α and k constant. Then, for each pairing of party
heterogeneity (d) on the x-axis and right party seat share (φ) on the y-axis, we determine what
motions would actually get proposed (allowing for a set of 121 bill-sq pairs in each, such that
b, sq ∈ {0, .1, .2, ..., 1}). Of those that either party leader would propose, we then determine the
percentage that will receive a roll call request. The darkest regions on each heat map correspond
to nearly every motion receiving a roll call request, while the lightest regions correspond to nearly
none of the motions receiving a roll call request.
In Figure OA.E1, each panel is increasing the value of k by 0.1 (L-R). Unsurprisingly, as the
cost of requesting a roll call vote increases, fewer roll call votes are requested. Within each panel, it
is also apparent that when party heterogeneity is greater, fewer roll call votes will be requested.
Finally, since any legislator can request a vote be taken by roll call, it is unsurprising that there is
little systematic effect of increasing the share of seats held by one party or the other.
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Figure OA.E1: Percentage of Motions Receiving Roll Call Vote Request (by k)
Turning to Figure OA.E2, the effects are somewhat less pronounced. As the weight assigned
to policy decreases, roll call votes appear to become less frequent. This is particularly true for
lower levels of party heterogeneity. As before, the proportion of votes receiving a RCV request is
decreasing in party heterogeneity and there is little effect of seat share.
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Figure OA.E2: Percentage of Motions Receiving Roll Call Vote Request (by α)
E.2 RCV Samples and Ideal Point Estimation
E.2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Simulations in Manuscript
Figures 1 and 2 of the manuscript demonstrate the ways in which the selection process of roll
call votes can lead to ideal point estimates that understate ideological variation among moderate
legislators. While the full sample of votes does a fairly good job discerning among legislators with
ideologies in the center of the policy dimension where voting occurs, it fails to pick up variation
in extremes due to a lack of discriminating votes. This is both true in empirical applications and
replicated in the simulation by restricting the set of feasible proposals and status quos to the
pareto set existing between the two party leaders’ ideal points (b, sq ∈ [0, 1]). In addition to not
discriminating among the ideologies of extreme legislators, the roll call vote sample fails to pick up
variation in ideology among moderate legislators with ideal points xij ∈ [0, 1] — as depicted for
individual legislators in Figure 1 of the manuscript and in aggregate in Figure 2 of the manuscript.
While these patterns are visually quite clear in the manuscript, we can see examining that data in
Table OA.E1 as well. While the average number of legislators in a given natural legislature that
our ideal point estimations suggest are equally extreme to either the right or left are about the
same across the Full and Roll Call Vote samples, there is a dramatic difference in the proportion of
legislators the models consider equally moderate. In the Full Sample, we expect to get on average
1-2 legislators identified as having the median ideal point of the legislature; in the RCV sample,
we expect to get on average 27 legislators identified as having the same median ideal point of the
legislature. While there is a substantial range on this number in the RCV sample that varies as a
function of the randomly drawn parameters for the randomly drawn natural legislature, the best
performing model on the RCV sample still placed 17 moderate legislatures at the median of the
legislature.
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mean median std dev. minimum maximum
Full Sample
minimum ideal point 29.8 32.5 10.8 12 46
median ideal point 1.5 1 0.6 1 3
maximum ideal point 33.2 34 7.8 12 47
RCV Sample
minimum ideal point 31.4 33.5 13.0 12 63
median ideal point 26.9 22 13.9 17 63
maximum ideal point 34.7 34.5 9.8 12 61
Table OA.E1: Summary Statistics for the ideal points simulated across 50 natural legislatures in
Figure 2 of the manuscript. For both the full and RCV samples, figures reflect the average, median,
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum number of legislators with ideal points equal to the
minimum, median, and maximum ideal point of the chamber.
E.2.2 Quantity vs. Prevalence of Roll Call Votes
In Figure 1 of the manuscript, we demonstrate the effect of increasing the prevalence of roll call votes
for our ability to extract ideal point estimates. As the prevalence of RCVs increases — in Figure
1 of the manuscript from (L-R) 7.8% to 15.2% to 45.3% — the models are more able to discern
(true) ideological differences between moderate legislators. In that exercise, however, as prevalence is
increasing so too is the absolute number of roll call votes — there were 78, 148, and 418, respectively.
Thus, one might alternatively infer it is the absolute number of roll call votes that drives the issue
we are highlighting, not the prevalence. To tease apart whether it is the absolute number of observed
roll call votes or the prevalence driving this effect, we run the following simulation on a single
natural legislature — that is, from one random draw of legislators ideal points, the same party
heterogeneity (d), the same seat share (φ), and the same cost of roll call request (k). All that is
changing across panels is the total number of motions (Votes) and total number of roll call votes,
































RCV on 28 of 134 Votes
RCV Prevalence: 20.9 %



































RCV on 48 of 236 Votes
RCV Prevalence: 20.3 %







































RCV on 104 of 490 Votes
RCV Prevalence: 21.2 %
d= 0.87 ; phi= 0.45 ; k= 0.35
● ●Left Party, Full Sample Left Party, RCV Sample Right Party, Full Sample Right Party, RCV Sample
Figure OA.E3: Prevalence of Roll Call Votes
As is clear moving across the three panels of Figure OA.E3, increasing the number of votes taken
by roll call does not change the problems associated with us only observing 20% of the total vote
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sample. While the estimates for the full sample (denoted by the solid circles and squares) are better
able to differentiate among median legislators as the sample of total votes increases, increasing the
size of the roll call vote sample does not change the fact that the properties of the partial sample
will understate true variation that exists among median legislators.
E.2.3 Variation in Party Heterogeneity by Party
All simulations and results discussed in the manuscript assume party heterogeneity is constant
across the parties. In the first two analyses that assume a single dimensional policy space (i.e.,
those results on ideal point estimation and party cohesion/unity scores), each natural legislature
has its own single random draw of party heterogeneity d ∼ U [.5, 2] which dictates the support of
the distribution from which legislator ideal points are drawn. In the third analysis that allows for a
two dimensional policy space, each policy dimension in each natural legislature has its own random
draw of party heterogeneity such that dk ∼ U [.5, 2] where k ∈ {1, 2} reflects the policy dimension.



































































Figure OA.E4: Allowing for differences in party heterogeneity across parties in a given natural
legislature, each stacked histogram depicts the proportion of legislators with ideal points equal to
the minimum, median, and maximum ideal point for that legislature. The black bars denote the
proportion of the left party and the grey bars denote the proportion of the right party.
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This is a simplifying theoretical assumption and it is not difficult to imagine a variety of policy
areas in which this is not the case. One might be concerned that if parties had different levels of
heterogeneity, this would affect the incentives to request roll call votes and in turn the motions
proposed by party leaders. To address this in the context of our model and its implications for ideal
point estimation, we re-examine the simulation that estimates proportion of legislators for whom
we would estimate having identical ideal points. In the manuscript, the results of this exercise for
constant levels of party heterogeneity are reported in Figure 2. To allow for varying level of party
heterogeneity, we simply take separate independent draws for party heterogeneity for the left and
right parties, such that dik for i ∈ {`, r} and k ∈ {1} reflects the party heterogeneity for party i on
dimension k. Therefore, when we take our random draw of j ∈ {1, ..., 100} legislator ideal points
for a given natural legislature, xijk ∼ U [Ii − dik, Ii + dik]. We then replicate the analysis depicted
in Figure 2 of the manuscript, estimating the ideal points of our 100 legislators across 50 natural
legislatures and then plotting the proportion of individual legislators with ideal points identical to
the minimum, median, and maximum ideal point of the chamber. The results of this exercise are
broken down by party in the following Figure OA.E4. The findings are nearly identical and to those
presented for the common party heterogeneity depicted in the manuscript.
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RCV on 174 of 926 Votes
d= 0.97 ; phi= 0.58 ; k= 0.25
Figure OA.E5: Robustness Checks for Ideal Point Estimation — Varying the α weighting parameter
Recall that when either party leader is deciding whether to propose a given motion, they take into
consideration both their utility over the proposal b compared to the status quo sq as well as their
return for relative cohesion. To allow for the flexibility that one of these objectives may be more
or less important for the party leaders, we include a weighting parameter (α > 0) on the policy
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term, meaning the importance assigned to the policy outcome relative to cohesion is increasing
in α. Throughout the main results presented in the manuscript, we assume α = 0.5, meaning the
import party leaders assign to policy outcomes is half as much as they assign to demonstrating
cohesion. To demonstrate the results on ideal point estimation are robust to this selection of α in
our simulations, the following replicates the results from Figure 1 in the manuscript across five
additional values: α = {0.01, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 3}. As we would expect given the results presented in
Figure OA.E2, changing the value of α is of no consequence for the results.
E.2.5 Analyzing Roll Call Votes with Very High and Very Low Prevalence
In each of the simulations in the manuscript, we choose parameter values that produce roll call
votes on roughly 10-20% of the total sample of proposed motions. Given the empirical results from
our survey of legislative procedures, this is in many cases a vast overstatement of the data contained
in roll call voting records. While it perhaps goes without saying that a legislatures with roll call
votes amounting to less than 2% of total votes are equally if not more worse off than those with the
higher number of roll call votes that we focus our attention, it is straightforward to demonstrate the
consequences of such small samples.
Consider the case of New Zealand, which as reported in Table 1 of the manuscript took 2% of
their 8291 total votes via roll call between 2003 and 2015. This time period spans the complete
48th-50th parliaments, so we can say on average this amounts to a natural legislature with 2763
total votes with 55 of them taken via roll call. By adjusting our parameter vales to approximate
this amount of total votes and roll call prevalence, we can generate the a sample which allows our
data generating process to approximate such a legislature. Here, for a higher cost of requesting a
roll call than we use throughout (k = .4) as well as more total votes (of 5500 potential motions, the
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RCV on 748 of 19936 Votes
d= 0.6 ; phi= 0.56 ; k= 0.35
Figure OA.E6: Ideal Point Estimation with (very) small samples of roll call votes. For the figure on
the left, we select parameter values that produce a sample similar to what we observe empirically
for the New Zealand Parliament: of the 2748 total votes, only 50 (1.8%) are taken via roll call. For
the figure on the right, we select parameter values that produce a sample similar to what we observe
empirically for the French National Assembly: of the 19,936 total votes, only 748 (3.75%) are taken
via roll call.
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With this sample, we then repeat the analysis from the manuscript and produce the ideal points
plotted in the left panel of Figure OA.E6. Unsurprisingly given the small sample of roll call votes, the
ideal point estimation is only able to discern 6 distinct ideal points for the 100 legislators. Further,
96 of the 100 legislators are estimated to have ideal points of the minimum, median, or maximum of
the legislature. While the estimation from the full sample obviously performs substantially better
than the significantly smaller roll call sample, it is again true that the properties of the roll call vote
sample make it particularly worse at discerning variation among moderate legislators.
We can repeat this exercise simulating a natural legislature similar to what we would expect
the lower house of the French Parliament (the National Assembly) to look like. While the National
Assembly exhibits a similarly low percentage of roll call votes (3.6% from 1998-2012), the large
number of total votes (62,185) means this amounts to substantially more roll call votes in practice.
This period includes the 11th, 12th, and 13th National Assemblies, meaning there are an average of
738 roll call votes and 20,728 total votes per National Assembly. By using a slightly lower cost of
requesting a roll call vote as before (k = 0.35) but with substantially more potential motions yielding
a total of 19,936 proposals, we are able to create a sample of 748 roll call votes, which amounts to
3.75% of all votes. Ideal points estimated from the full and roll call vote samples created to reflect
a legislature similar to the National Assembly are depicted in the right panel of Figure OA.E6.
The slightly higher prevalence of roll call votes (from 1.8% to 3.6%) in France does lead to some
improvement in the distinction between legislators, but not much. The estimates from roll call
votes alone produce only 10 distinct ideal points, with 94 of the 100 legislators receiving either the
minimum, median, or maximum ideal point.
By contrast, we can similarly examine simulated data for natural legislatures with very high
levels of roll call vote prevalence. For example, in Table 1 of the manuscript the legislature with
the highest prevalence of roll call votes is Switzerland with 66% of all votes taken via roll call. If
we lower the cost associated with roll call vote requests to k = 0.1 and α = 0.5, we can generate a
sample of 50 natural legislatures in which the average roll call vote prevalence is 63.9%. When we
estimate the ideal points using this sample of roll call votes, we find that on average 10.32 legislators
per natural legislature are assigned the identical median ideal point such that we cannot distinguish
among them ideologically. While this is a vast improvement over the previous two examples of very
low roll call prevalence, the problem remains even for legislatures with maximally prevalent roll call
votes.
E.2.6 Ideal Point Estimation with Exogenous Agenda
All results in the manuscript as well as the appendix allow for an endogenous agenda in the sense
that for a given natural legislature, any randomly drawn motion (b, sq) is only proposed and enters
our sample of votes if either party leader would do so. One alternative way of populating the
legislative agenda would be to randomly draw this same set of motions but assume they are all
proposed — i.e., removing the discretion of the party leaders to propose the motion or not. To
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Figure OA.E7: Ideal Point Estimation with Exogenous Agenda
of the agenda, we can randomly simulate legislative agendas for a set of natural legislatures and
then re-estimate our ideal points to determine whether the issue of not being able to distinguish
among median legislators remains. In Figure OA.E7, we plot the percentage of legislators co-located
at the chamber median for both the full sample of votes (in grey) and the partial sample of votes
for which a roll call vote would be requested (in black) alongside the prevalence of RCV in that
natural legislature. As before, across all levels of roll call vote prevalence, the selection process by
which roll call vote samples are generated results in more moderate legislators being co-located at
the median of the chamber.
E.3 RCV Samples and Cohesion & Unity Scores
E.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Simulations in Manuscript
In Figure 4 of the manuscript, we depict the distribution of differences in cohesion scores between
unobserved and observed votes. The summary statistics for that figure are provided in the first
row of Table OA.E2 under “Signed Differences, All,” indicating it includes for the entire sample
of 50 randomly drawn legislatures the distribution of Cohesion on Unobserved Votes - Cohesion
on RCVs. To get a sense of the average absolute magnitude of this difference, we also include here
the descriptive statistics for the absolute difference: ||Cohesion on Unobserved Votes - Cohesion on
RCVs||.
To examine whether the sizable differences are only occurring in those legislatures that are in
some sense “extreme” — either because they are for legislatures in which one party holds a sizable
majority of the seats (i.e., a very large or very small φ) or because the legislators within a party are
ideologically diverse (i.e., a large d) — we examine the distribution of differences for a subsample of
observations restricting the values of φ ∈ [.35, .65] and d ∈ [.75, 1.5]. The descriptive statistics for
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mean median std. dev. minimum maximum
Signed Difference
All 0.02 0.02 0.09 -0.16 0.22
Subsample 0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.16 0.21
Absolute Difference
All 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.001 0.22
Subsample 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.005 0.21
Table OA.E2: Summary statistics for differences in cohesion scores across unobserved votes and
observed roll call votes, as depicted in Figure 4 of the manuscript. Each figure in the table reflects
the difference between cohesion for unobserved and observed votes, meaning positive values of the
signed difference indicate unobserved cohesion is greater than that which we observe with roll call
votes. The subsample corresponds to the sample of “typical” legislatures defined above.
this subsample are included in Table OA.E2 again for both the signed and absolute difference in
cohesion scores.
E.3.2 Robustness Checks on Policy Weight Parameter (α)
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Left Proposed, RCV Left Proposed, No RCV Right Proposed, RCV Right Proposed, No RCV
Figure OA.E8: Each figure shows for the left and right party across values of party heterogeneity
(d) and seats controlled by the right party (φ) the differences in cohesion across both unobserved
(non-RCV) votes and observed (RCV) votes in, divided by the which party made the proposal. All
simulations are the same as those in the manuscript with the exceptions that α = 1 and we run
fewer (100) simulations, which is why the lines appear less smooth.
To demonstrate the simulation results on party cohesion and unity depicted in Figures 3 and 4
of the manuscript are not sensitive to the choice of the parameter α that acts as a weight placed
by the party leader on policy vis-a-vis cohesion, we re-simulate and estimate the models for α = 1.
When α = 1, this corresponds to party leaders who assign equal weight to outcomes over policy
and the demonstration of party cohesion. In Figure OA.E8, we repeat the analysis for the effect
of the parameters for party heterogeneity (d) and right party seat share (φ) on party cohesion in
the observed and unobserved sample. The key insights remain the same: the proposing party will
appear consistently more cohesive on roll call votes than on unobserved votes, while the opposite is
true for the non-proposing party. As we would expect, party cohesion is monotonically decreasing in
party heterogeneity for both parties regardless of the proposing party and in both the observed and
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unobserved samples of votes. In Figure OA.E8c-d, we again see a similar result from the manuscript
concerning the relationship between the share of seats in the legislature and party cohesion.














Figure OA.E9: Distribution of the difference between party cohesion in Unobserved (Non-RCV)
votes and cohesion in observed (RCV) votes in each of the 50 natural legislatures. All simulations
are the same as those in the manuscript with the exception α = 1.
Continuing the robustness check for α = 1, Figure OA.E9 illustrates the difference between
average unity scores in the unobserved and observed samples. As before, unity scores are neither
systematically over- nor under-estimated. Further, the frequency with which these differences are
meaningfully different from zero indicates cohesion scores estimated from roll call votes are frequently
unrepresentative of the degree of party cohesion in all legislative voting. For an α = 1, we find that
in 22% of the simulated natural legislatures, the difference between RCV and non RCV average
unity scores is at least 10% for one of the two parties.
E.3.3 Robustness Checks on Cost of Roll Call Vote Request (k)
In the simulations on cohesion and unity scores in the manuscript we selected a value of k = 0.2 to
reflect the cost of roll call vote requests. As the panel of heat maps in Figure OA.E1 demonstrate,
increasing k reduces the proportion of proposals receiving a roll call vote request across all values
of party heterogeneity (d) and seat share (φ). To ensure these results are not a function of the
arbitrarily/inductively choice of k, we repeat the above analysis in Figures OA.E10 and OA.E11 for
k = {0.1, 0.3}.
In Figure OA.E10 we replicate the findings presented in Figure 3 of the manuscript for k = 0.1
in the top row and k = 0.3 in the bottom row. While the trends remain almost identical to those
presented in the manuscript for k = 0.2, it is clear how changes in the cost of requesting a roll call
vote affect the patterns we observe. Recall from Figure OA.E1 the proportion of motions receiving
roll call votes is going to be high, and even approaching 100%. It is therefore unsurprising that
for smaller values of k we see the patterns for observed and unobserved votes converging on one
another, though even for a fairly small k they remain substantively distinct. By the same token, as
we increase k and see an even lower prevalence of roll call votes in the bottom row of Figure OA.E10,
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Figure OA.E10: Each figure shows for the left and right parties the differences in cohesion for
both unobserved (non-RCV) votes and observed (RCV) votes across values of party heterogeneity
(d) and seats controlled by the right party (φ). We further divide the data by which party leader
proposed the motion. All simulations are the same as those in the manuscript with the exceptions
that k = {0.1, 0.3} and for computational convenience we run fewer (50) simulations, which is why
the lines are less smooth.
the differences we see in the observed and unobserved samples can grow quite large for all values of
d and φ.


































Figure OA.E11: Distribution of the difference between party cohesion in Unobserved (Non-RCV)
votes and cohesion in observed (RCV) votes in each of the 50 natural legislatures. All simulations
are the same as those in the manuscript with the exception that k = 0.1 (L) or k = 0.3 (R).
In Figure OA.E11 we turn to the effect of k on the distribution of the difference between cohesion
in the observed and unobserved samples. Again, as we would expect these differences are most
extreme as we increase k and reduce the prevalence of roll call votes, and smaller but still meaningful
for small costs of roll call requests. For the left panel of Figure OA.E11 in which k = 0.1, the natural
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legislatures in this sample take on average 65% of their total votes by roll call. As our empirical
findings indicate, this would be a rare case similar to what we see in Switzerland but no where else
in our sample. While we do see here that the non-RCV cohesion is more similar to the observed
cohesion we see for roll call votes, it is even still true here that 4% of the legislatures would be off by
10+% in either direction and 41% would be off by 5+% in either direction. Thus while expanding
the prevalence of roll call votes certainly improves the inferences we can draw from the roll call vote
sample alone, it does not eliminate the issues of sample selection entirely even for an extreme case
like this.
In the right panel of Figure OA.E11 we assess the robustness of our main result by increasing the
cost of requesting a roll call vote (k = 0.3). This produces a set of natural legislatures for which the
average prevalence of roll call voting is 14.5% of total votes, a figure more in line with our empirical
findings than the previous example in which k = 0.1. As we would expect, the more selective sample
of roll call votes creates a greater differences in cohesion between the observed and unobserved votes.
For over half of the natural legislatures in this sample (53 of 100), estimates of cohesion from the
roll call vote sample would be off by 10+% compared to those of the unobserved votes.
E.3.4 Party Cohesion with Exogenous Agenda















Figure OA.E12: Distribution of the difference between party cohesion in Unobserved (Non-RCV)
votes and cohesion in observed (RCV) votes in each of the 50 natural legislatures with an exogenous
agenda.
We can also consider whether the result concerning the differences between party cohesion on
observed and unobserved votes are robust to the use of an exogenous agenda. As before with the
case of ideal point estimation with an exogenous legislative agenda, we populate the set of proposals
on which legislators will vote with a randomly drawn set of motions (b, sq) and assume each of these
will be proposed. Once proposed, each individual legislator must decide whether to request a roll call
vote and how they will vote. To demonstrate our findings presented in Figure 4 of the manuscript
are robust to an exogenous legislative agenda, we replicate the analysis that looks at the absolute
difference in party cohesion between the observed RCV sample and unobserved non-RCV sample.
These results for k = 0.2 are presented in Figure OA.E12. We find a similar distribution to that
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which we saw for an endogenous agenda. For 31% of natural legislatures, party cohesion inferred
from the roll call vote sample is greater than 10% different than it is in the sample of unobserved
votes.
E.4 RCV Samples and Policy Dimensions
E.4.1 Robustness Checks on Cost of Roll Call Vote Request (k)
In the manuscript we demonstrate for a sample of 25 natural legislatures how using a roll call vote
sample to discern the appropriate number of policy dimensions may result in an underestimation of
dimensionality. In the main results, we simulate the data assuming an α = 0.5 and a cost of roll call
votes k equal to 0.35. This produces a sample of 546 votes of which 60 are taken via roll call (11%).
Given the empirical findings about the low prevalence of roll call votes in many contexts, this is
an appropriate starting point for how we might think about the consequences for assessing policy
dimensions.














Mean Total Votes 527 546 580 608 654 748
Mean % Roll Call 8% 11% 17% 20% 25% 34%
All Votes
% Votes on d1 50% 50% 49% 49% 50% 49%
% Votes on d2 50% 50% 51% 51% 50% 51%
% ID 2 dimensions 96 - 100% 96 - 100% 92 - 100% 96 - 100% 96% 100%
Roll Call Votes
% Votes on d1 42% 42% 40% 35% 36% 44%
% Votes on d2 58% 58% 60% 65% 64% 56%
% ID 2 dimensions 36 - 56% 56 - 80% 72 - 96% 72 - 96% 80 - 96% 92-100%
Table OA.E3: Robustness of Dimensionality Results for Values of k and α. All figures correspond to
the mean across the 25 simulated natural legislatures with the given parameter values. For the rows
indicating the percentage of simulations correctly identifying the two policy dimensions, the upper
bound corresponds to the result given an eigenvalue of 1 threshold and the lower bound corresponds
to an “elbow” method — see Figures OA.E13 and OA.E14 for scree plots of the eigenvalues.
To demonstrate how these findings are affected by changes in the cost of requesting a roll call
vote (k) and thus in turn the prevalence of votes taken via roll call, we conduct a series of robustness
checks that repeat our analysis of dimensionality across different values of k. In Table OA.E3, we
show the key quantities of interest for k ∈ {0.4, 0.35, 0.3, 0.25, 0.2, 0.15}. When k = 0.4, we simulate
a sample of 527 total votes for which 8% receive a roll call vote. In the full sample, there is an
even split of votes across the two dimensions and, on average, the models correctly pick up the two
dimensions 96-100% of the time. The roll call vote sample performs much less well. The models only
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correctly identify the existence of two policy dimensions for 36-56% of natural legislatures and a
disproportionate amount of the observed votes (58%) are on policies from the dimension in which
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Missed Second














(b) Observed Roll Call Votes
Average % RCV  =  8 %
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(b) Observed Roll Call Votes
Average % RCV  =  16 %
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Figure OA.E13: Scree plots corresponding to models (1), (3), and (4) in Table OA.E3.
As we lower the cost of requesting a roll call vote, the likelihood that the models pick up the
two policy dimensions increases. On the other extreme, for the natural legislatures simulated with a
k = 0.15, roll call votes are on average 34% of the total votes. While votes on the first dimension
are still underrepresented, the models on average perform quite well picking up the two policy
dimensions 92-100% of the time. Across the intermediate ranges of k, it is clear both the prevalence
of roll call vote requests and ability of the models to pick up the two dimensions are increasing as k
decreases. However, decreasing k does not affect the imbalance of roll call vote requests across the
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(b) Observed Roll Call Votes
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Figure OA.E14: Scree plots corresponding to models (5) and (6) in Table OA.E3.
E.4.2 Robustness Checks on Policy Weight Parameter (α)
Finally, we can illustrate the robustness of our findings concerning dimensionality to variation in the
weight parameter, α. In Figure OA.E15 we replicate the initial model with k = 0.35 and α = 0.1.
Compared to the primary simulation included in the manuscript in which α = 0.5, this robustness
check reflects the case in which party leaders assign equal weight to policy outcome and cohesion
considerations. In the new model, an average of 9% of the total 535 votes are taken via roll call. The
models on the full sample of votes correctly identify the two dimensions in 92-100% of the natural
legislatures, while the partial sample only picks up the two dimensions in 52-76% of the natural
legislatures. As before, in the roll call vote sample those votes on the more heterogeneous policy
dimension are under-represented compared to votes on the less heterogeneous policy dimension (40
vs. 60%), but the split is equal in the full sample.
E.4.3 Quantity vs. Prevalence of Roll Call Votes
Here we turn to the question of whether increasing the absolute number of roll call votes while
holding the relative percentage of the total voting sample constant enables us to draw better
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Figure OA.E15: Scree plots for robustness check on policy weight parameter, α = 1 and κ = 0.35.










Mean Total Votes 546 836 1097 1655
Mean % Roll Call 11% 12% 11% 11%
All Votes
% Votes on d1 50% 50% 50% 50%
% Votes on d2 50% 50% 50% 50%
% ID 2 dimensions 92 - 100% 100% 92 - 100% 84 - 100%
Roll Call Votes
% Votes on d1 42% 31% 39% 44%
% Votes on d2 58% 69% 61% 56%
% ID 2 dimensions 56 - 80% 40 - 64% 44-72% 44 - 68%
Table OA.E4: Holding the prevalence of roll call votes across natural legislatures constant, each
column shows the results of our analyses on dimensionality while increasing the absolute number of
roll call votes in the sample.
while holding their prevalence constant affects our ability to discern the dimensionality of legislative
policy, we repeat the analysis in the manuscript for larger samples of roll call votes while maintaining
the prevalence from 11-12%. With the initial results for a legislature with 546 total votes presented
in column 1 of Table OA.E4, we replicate this analysis and present the results in columns 2, 3 and 4
for legislatures with 836, 1097, and 1655 votes, respectively.
As is clear from the table, our ability to discern correctly the existence of the two policy
dimensions is not necessarily improved as we increase the total number of roll call votes in a given
legislature while holding their prevalence constant. As the quantity of roll call votes increases, there
is no measurable improvement in the percentage of legislatures for which the two dimensional policy
space is recognized. For example, while the initial sample we used of 546 total votes with 11% roll
call votes, our analysis suggests the models may get up to 80% of legislatures “correct” in terms of
picking up the two policy dimensions. However, if we just over double our sample of total votes to
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1097 of which 11% are roll called, the last row of column 3 shows our models may correctly indicate
two policy dimensions in as few as 44% and only as many as 72% of natural legislatures. When we
compare these results to those in Table OA.E3, it appears to be the prevalence of roll call votes
that matters for the purpose of identifying policy dimensions rather than the absolute number of
roll call votes.
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Figure OA.E16: Scree plots for robustness check on exogenous legislative agenda.
Finally, we examine how simulating votes according to an exogenous (randomly drawn) legislative
agenda affects our results concerning the ability of our ideal point estimation models to discern
multiple policy dimensions. To do this, we replicate the analysis presented in Figure 5 of the
manuscript after eliminating the option for a randomly drawn motion on one of two dimensions to
not be proposed by either party. These results are presented for a sample of 25 natural legislatures
all with a k = 0.35 in Figure OA.E16. When using the full sample of votes and the eigenvalue of one
threshold, our model correctly identifies the two policy dimensions for the entire sample of natural
legislatures. If we increased this threshold to 2, it would incorrectly suggest with the full sample of
votes that 8% of our natural legislatures (or 2 of 25) exhibit only a single policy dimension. Turning
to estimates of the same model on the roll call vote sample, the eigenvalue of one threshold would
lead us to missing the second policy dimension in 24% (or 6/25) of our natural legislatures. With
the higher threshold of 2, we see our models fail to pick up the second policy dimension in 40% (or
10/25) of our natural legislatures.
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